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“Merely invoking tortious interference will send shivers down an M&A law-
yer’s spine.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A bank promises to lend several billion dollars to fund a buyer’s
purchase of a target company.  The buyer enters into a merger agreement
with the target.  Thereafter, the economy plummets, and the bank decides
that breaching its contract with the buyer will cost less than performing.
The buyer seeks specific performance.  The target also sues the bank, al-
leging tortious interference with the merger agreement.  Billions of dollars
are on the line.
This is the reality lived by many investment banks that committed to
fund leveraged buyouts during the recent economic downturn.  Most of
these matters were resolved in private settlements to avoid the possibility
of crippling tort liability and publicly airing the messy details of the
targets’ poor financial circumstances.  The judicial decisions that do exist
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Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP.  During the credit crisis, Mr. Nikas represented parties
involved in litigation concerning over $200 billion of troubled mergers, acquisitions, and
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† J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2008; M.S., Johns Hopkins
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1. Steven M. Davidoff, Wachovia and the Uncertainty Principle, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Oct. 3, 2008, 12:05 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/wachovia-and-
the-uncertainty-principle/.
1
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reveal a myopic view of the relationship between the buyer’s specific per-
formance claim against the bank, on the one hand, and the target’s tort
claim against the bank, on the other.  By treating these claims as substan-
tively distinct, courts threaten to impose an inefficient liability rule for the
bank’s allegedly tortious conduct (including the possibility of punitive
damages) and an equally inefficient property rule for the bank’s alleged
breach of contract (specific performance).  Courts must take a singular
view of the combined costs and efficiencies created by the buyer’s and
target’s individual claims to properly determine the appropriate remedy
for the bank’s conduct.
Part II addresses the current state of tortious-interference law and the
viability of the target’s tortious-interference claim.  This section analyzes
and identifies relevant precedents that have gone largely unnoticed both in
litigation and commentary related to a bank’s potential liability for tor-
tious interference.
Part III explains that allowing both the buyer’s and target’s claims to
succeed against the bank is inefficient because it increases ex ante and ex
post costs of negotiations and overcompensates the target for its alleged
harm.
Part IV argues that the target’s tort claim should fail, unless the bank
causes a wrongful breach or its conduct is independently unlawful.  Fur-
ther, expectation damages (a liability rule)—i.e., damages that put the
buyer in the position in which it would have been had the bank fulfilled its
obligation—should apply to the buyer’s contract claim (assuming there is a
breach), unless the bank’s breach is opportunistic.  In addition, the rules of
evidence should be amended and the common law further developed to
prevent a target from introducing evidence of most settlement negotia-
tions between the buyer and bank to prove the bank’s intent to interfere
with the merger agreement.
Part V concludes by demonstrating that this debate matters.  Mergers
are an integral part of the economic landscape, resulting in billions of dol-
lars changing hands every year.  And yet, the litigation that impacts these
deals when they become troubled reflects a deep misunderstanding of the
financial industry, tort law, and the law of remedies.  These failures have
massive economic consequences, as well as far-reaching implications for
analogous disputes to which the caselaw and incentives at issue apply.  The
debate ensnares billion-dollar transactions as readily as everyday transac-
tions involving a set of interlocking contracts.  These inefficiencies waste
billions of dollars; they throw sand in the wheels of innumerable business
transactions.  Enough is enough.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF TORTIOUS-INTERFERENCE LAW
In simple terms, a merger is a process whereby two or more autono-
mous companies combine to form a single entity.  Motives for engaging in
mergers vary (e.g., the achievement of economies of scale and scope, the
unlocking of synergies, and product and geographic diversification). Meth-
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ods of purchase differ as well: a buyer can acquire a target company using
its stock or cash, either from its war chest or borrowed.  This article fo-
cuses on potential liability arising when a buyer seeks to borrow money to
purchase a target, otherwise known as a leveraged buyout, and the deal
subsequently goes awry.
The corporate law community has immersed itself in a roiling debate
over the viability of a target’s tortious-interference claim in these circum-
stances.  At least one commentator has stated that tortious interference
with contract is a viable claim in a leveraged-buyout case,2 and one court
has found that a bank cannot even litigate its obligations under its commit-
ment letter without the possibility of being held liable for tortiously inter-
fering with the target’s merger agreement.3  Hyped-up references to the
multi-billion dollar verdict in Pennzoil4 and viral speculations about
whether the troubled mergers would close have clouded the rational as-
sessment of tortious-interference law.  This section fills that gap.
A. Elements and Nature of the Tort
Attorneys that paper corporate transactions forecast risk: what dis-
putes may arise and how the merger agreement or the commitment letter
should address them.  They also use forum-selection and choice-of-law
clauses to decide where those disputes should be litigated, if they need to
be, and which state’s law would apply if they are.  While banks may, there-
fore, gauge how a court of their choosing would interpret their commit-
ment letter, a contractual choice-of-law provision would likely not bind a
target in a tort action against the lending bank.5  That dispute would in-
2. Clear Channel: Lessons Learned, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 14, 2008, 11:02
AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/clear-channel-lessons-learned/.
3. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Huntsman Corp., 269 S.W.3d 722, 725, 730
(Tex. App. 2008).
4. In Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), a Texas appellate
court upheld substantially all of a state court jury verdict in excess of ten billion dollars in a
tortious-interference action.  Plaintiff Pennzoil in essence alleged that Texaco tortiously in-
terfered with Pennzoil’s efforts to acquire Getty Oil via a tender offer by making a subse-
quent, larger tender offer that was ultimately accepted by Getty.  An action to challenge the
constitutionality of the verdict was brought in federal court and was the subject of important
litigation on the question of federal jurisdiction in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1
(1987).  The Supreme Court held that Younger abstention required the federal district court
to abstain from hearing the claims brought by Texaco challenging the constitutionality of the
Texas jury verdict. Id. See also Timothy S. Feltham, Note, Tortious Interference With Con-
tractual Relations: The Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. Litigation, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111
(1988); Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the ‘Fat Lady’ Sing?: An Analysis of ‘Agreements in
Principle’ in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (1986); Roger M. Baron &
Ronald J. Baron, The Pennzoil-Texaco Dispute: An Independent Analysis, 38 BAYLOR L.
REV. 253 (1986). See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining
and Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295 (1989) (providing a
thorough background of the Pennzoil litigation).
5. See, e.g., Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 335
(2d Cir. 2005) (“Under New York law, then, tort claims are outside the scope of contractual
choice-of-law provisions that specify what law governs construction of the terms of the con-
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stead be governed by whichever state’s law prevails in a choice-of-law
analysis, potentially exposing banks to tort claims in far-flung jurisdictions
they would prefer to avoid.  Thus, the applicable law of tortious interfer-
ence may extend as widely as the geographical region in which banks
choose to fund deals (although many states have adopted similar doctrines
of tortious interference).
New York, for example, adopts a common formulation of the tortious-
interference doctrine, under which a target would be required to prove the
following four elements:
1. the existence of a valid contract between the target and the buyer, such as
a merger agreement;
2. the bank’s knowledge of that contract;
3. the bank’s intentional and improper procuring of the buyer’s breach of
that contract; and
4. actual breach of that contract and damages resulting therefrom.6
This article assumes that the target will be able to prove elements one,
two, and four.  Thus, if the bank has intentionally and improperly caused
the buyer to breach its merger agreement with the target, the target has
stated a cause of action for tortious interference.  Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 767 identifies several factors to guide the analysis of element three:
• the nature of the actor’s conduct;
• the actor’s motive;
• the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes;
• the interests sought to be advanced by the actor;
• the social interests in protecting the actor’s freedom of action and the
other’s contractual interests;
• the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference; and
• the relations between the parties.7
tract, even when the contract also includes a broader forum-selection clause.”); Walker v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., No. 06 C 6906, 2007 WL 967888, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2007)
(holding that contractual choice-of-law clauses “do not govern tort claims unless it is clear
this was the parties’ intent” and finding that a choice-of-law provision, which did not by its
terms apply to “any action,” did not apply to extracontractual tort claims). But see, e.g., Fla.
State Bd. of Admin. v. Law Eng’g & Envtl. Servs., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1012 (D. Minn.
2003) (applying Minnesota choice of law principles and holding contractual choice-of-law
clause applicable to tort claims related to the contract).
6. White Plains Coat & Apron Co. v. Cintas Corp., 867 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 2007).
The law in other states is similar. See, e.g., Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532
A.2d 983, 992 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“There must be (1) a contract, (2) about which defendant
knew and (3) an intentional act that is a significant factor in causing the breach of such
contract (4) without justification (5) which causes injury.”); Nelson v. Fleet Nat’l Bank, 949 F.
Supp. 254, 260 (D. Del. 1996) (under Delaware law, defendant’s conduct must be improper).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).  New York, Delaware, and sev-
eral other states have adopted these factors. See, e.g., MLI Indus. Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban
Dev. Corp., 613 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (New York); Lloyd v. Jefferson, 53 F.
Supp. 2d 643 (D. Del. 1999) (Delaware); Neonatology Assoc’ns v. Phx. Perinatal Assocs., 164
P.3d 691 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (Arizona); Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp.
2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Indiana); Gen. Electric Capital Corp. v. Commercial Servs. Grp.,
485 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (Iowa).
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Flexible standards often lead to unpredictable outcomes.  We must
therefore ask what such a standard means in practice; that is, how courts
have applied the standard in cases like the one being discussed here.
At this point, the terrain divides.  Two categories of cases suggest, for
different reasons, that when the breach of one contract causes the failure
of another, the breaching party should not be liable for tortious interfer-
ence.  A third category suggests that banks may properly raise a defense of
economic justification.  But outliers exist.  And, adding to the very real
possibility of tort liability, courts that have dismissed tortious-interference
claims have either insufficiently articulated the underlying reasons for do-
ing so or not applied those reasons to facts that would easily compare to
our hypothetical.  What they have said does move the ball forward; it is a
step toward developing a comprehensive rationale for when tort liability
should exist.  Ultimately, however, the facts in those cases were different,
and the stakes lower.  Billions of dollars were not on the line.
As the cases start to fall into place, so do the lines we need to draw.
When should a bank be liable for tortious interference and when should it
not be?  It is critical to assess and answer this question carefully, because a
target’s attempt to leverage a tortious-interference claim into a favorable
settlement represents precisely the sort of perceived blackmail that some
might say has driven Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) clause
litigation.8
Tough financial times make MAC clauses more appealing, but MAC
clauses are difficult to invoke successfully.  It is important that they be that
way.  MAC clauses seek to cure the “lemon problem”—a problem of in-
formation asymmetry between buyer and seller, not a problem of aversion
to the risk inherent in the transaction itself.9  With this view in hand,
courts have set the bar high.10  No buyer has successfully invoked a MAC
clause to avoid its obligations.  And only one court has found a MAC, a
finding made largely irrelevant by the unique language in the merger
8. A MAC clause is a provision that permits the buyer (or any other specified party)
to refuse to complete the transaction if such a change, as defined by the agreement, occurs.
Substantial litigation has resulted over the interpretation of these clauses and whether the
facts at issue constitute a material adverse change that permits the party invoking the clause
to terminate the deal.
9. See David Cheng, Interpretation of Material Adverse Change Clauses in an Adverse
Economy, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 564, 569-71 (2009).
10. See, e.g., Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027
(Del. Ch. April 29, 2005) (adopting the Tyson standard under Delaware law and stating that
the event must be “catastrophic”); IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch.
2001) (applying New York law and stating that the event must be durationally significant).
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agreement and the court’s ultimate holding that an exception to the MAC
clause applied.11  Authors have urged courts to continue this trend.12
Nevertheless, “‘[m]aterial adverse change’ are ‘magic words that usu-
ally permit a buyer to walk away without a financial penalty.’  Just like
other types of litigation, MAC cases are often settled before reaching a
courtroom.”13  Ironically, some perceived victims of those practices have
been the ones destroying efficiencies that might have been possible
through renegotiated commitment letters.  Hexion’s Delaware and Texas
litigations with Huntsman provide a prime example, although Hexion’s
MAC assertion backfired.
In 2007, Hexion and Huntsman entered into a merger agreement
under which Hexion agreed to acquire Huntsman at $28 per share.14
Huntsman soon ran into financial trouble.  Its quarterly results missed the
projections conveyed to Hexion when they signed the deal.  Without the
banks’ knowledge, Hexion obtained an opinion asserting that the com-
bined Hexion-Huntsman entity would be insolvent.15  Hexion then filed
suit, seeking a declaration that it was not required to close for two reasons:
(1) the combined entity would be insolvent, and (2) Huntsman had suf-
fered a MAC.16
The question of insolvency was not yet ripe because the banks had not
refused to fund the deal.17  But the court methodically dismantled Hex-
ion’s MAC claim.18  In a strong rebuke of Hexion’s strategy, the court
11. See Genesco, Inc. v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III) 1, 33 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 20th
Dist. Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/wsj071227-
lb-finishline_headwind.pdf; see also Steven M. Davidoff, Genesco v. Finish Line: The Opin-
ion, M&A LAW PROF BLOG (Dec. 27, 2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/
12/genesco-the-opi.html.
12. See Cheng, supra note 9, at 599-603; Steven M. Davidoff, The State of the MAC,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 7, 2008), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/the-
state-of-the-mac.
13. Cheng, supra note 9, at 602 (quoting Andrew R. Sorkin, If Buyout Firms Are So
Smart, Why Are They So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
11/18/business/18deal.html); see also id. at 675 (noting that “[j]ust like in other recent deals,
the buyers [in the Sallie Mae litigation] were able to renegotiate without any serious financial
penalty merely by asserting a MAE”).
14. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 723 (Del. Ch.
2008).  In July 2007, Hexion—owned by private equity firm Apollo Management—agreed to
acquire rival chemical company Huntsman.  This horizontal merger was expected to create
the largest specialty chemical company in the world, achieving for its participants great syner-
gies, economies of scale and scope, and geographic diversification.  Once the financial crisis
took hold in 2008 and the demand for chemicals nosedived, however, Hexion and the banks
that were to finance the deal allegedly wanted out.  Litigation ensued, first between Hexion
and Huntsman (Hexion was ordered by Vice Chancellor Lamb of the Delaware Chancery
Court to perform the conditions precedent to closing) and then between Hexion and the
banks (the banks allegedly refused to provide the necessary financing).
15. Id. at 721.
16. Id. at 723.
17. Id. at 758.
18. Id. at 736.
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concluded that Hexion knowingly and intentionally breached the merger
agreement—a conclusion that removed the $325 million termination fee as
the upper limit of Hexion’s liability.19
The specific details of Huntsman’s Texas lawsuit against Hexion and
the resulting $1.73 billion settlement are not relevant for the purposes of
this discussion.  It is enough to say here that Huntsman’s case turned sig-
nificantly on the appeal to Texas jurors of throwing mud at two Wall Street
investment banks that had allegedly duped a Texas company.20  As one
commentator put it, “[t]he legal case for Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank
was a good one—in truth, Huntsman had only snippets of e-mail messages
and other statements, a very good narrative story and a Texas jury.”21  The
core theory of the case—that the banks never intended to honor their
commitment letter—defied common sense.  The banks earned their fee
only if the deal closed.  They were stuck with the potential of billions of
dollars of liabilities if it did not.  Huntsman had no good explanation for
this gaping hole, but the case settled anyway.22
In a world of high-stakes litigation, settlements of this magnitude
should be no surprise.  Even a minuscule risk of losing at trial—at which
Huntsman, for example, demanded $4 billion in damages23—translates
19. Id. at 746.
20. See David Bario, In Opening Arguments at $4.65 Billion Trial, Gibbs & Bruns Tells
Texas Jury that Banks Betrayed Huntsman, AM. LAWYER (July 15, 2009), http://www.ameri
canlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202431483064&In_Opening_Arguments_at_465_Bil
lion_Trial_Gibbs__Bruns_Tells_Texas_Jury_that_Banks_Betrayed_Huntsman (quoting
Huntsman’s attorney as stating that “[t]hese banks gave Huntsman a commitment that they
never intended to honor.  If they had just told Huntsman the truth, none of us would be
here”; and the jurors would see documents that would show how “‘these enormous invest-
ment banks wield enormous power,’ and how their private discussions about Huntsman (fil-
led with ‘harsh words’ and ‘expletives’) revealed their true intentions.”); see also Steven M.
Davidoff, Live-Blogging the Huntsman Trial, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 15, 2009, 3:00
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/live-blogging-the-huntsman-trial/ (“The banks
appear to have a better legal case, but Huntsman also appears to have some advantage here
in that the company has a tangible narrative, and there are some damaging e-mail messages it
can throw in.”).
21. Steven M. Davidoff, A Huntsman Victory in More Ways Than One, N.Y. TIMES,
DEALBOOK (June 23, 2009, 3:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/a-huntsman-
victory-in-more-ways-than-one/.
22. Press Release, Huntsman Corporation, Huntsman Reaches Settlement with Banks
for $1.73 Billion of Cash and Financing (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.huntsman
.com/corporate/Applications/itemrenderer?p_rendertitle=no&p_renderdate=no&p_render
teaser=no&p_item_id=241465612&p_item_caid=1123; see also Bario, supra note 20 (noting
before the settlement that, “for the banks . . . the challenge will be to convince the jury that
the voluminous e-mail exchanges and discussions that their clients had with Apollo about
crafting the merger and then mitigating their losses were nothing unusual for lenders and
their private equity clients.  [The banks] made a strong start Monday, but we predict [that the
banks] are going to have a long few weeks in Conroe if Huntsman and the banks can’t settle
this one.”).
23. Huntsman Gets Personal in Apollo Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 23,
2008, 10:17 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/huntsman-sues-apollo-and-
its-top-executives-over-hexion-deal/.
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into a sky-high settlement value.  Targets know this risk exists, and they
can and have exploited it.  Yet, these settlements should not always be
acceptable outcomes.  In some instances, the law ought to be more respon-
sive to the facts at hand and the policies that generated the relevant legal
doctrines in the first place.
B. Caselaw
1. The Breach of One Contract that Incidentally Causes Failure of
Another Cannot Give Rise to a Tortious-Interference Claim
Motive is key.  A defendant that wanted its breach to cause the breach
of a second contract has likely committed tortious interference; a defen-
dant that wanted only to breach, not to cause the incidental breach of an-
other contract, is more likely to escape liability.
In Alvord & Swift v. Stewart M. Muller Construction Co., Inc.,24 Muller
(a general contractor) promised New York Telephone Company
(“NYTC”) that it would renovate NYTC’s property.25  Alvord & Swift (a
subcontractor) then signed a contract with Muller agreeing to perform
some of this work.26  The construction took longer than expected, how-
ever, and the delay allegedly caused Alvord to incur additional expenses.27
Alvord filed a tortious-interference claim against NYTC, arguing that
NYTC breached its contract with Muller by failing to supervise Muller and
the construction project, thereby interfering with Alvord’s contract with
Muller.28
The New York Court of Appeals granted NYTC’s summary judgment
motion.29  As the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines it, “intent”
means the desire to cause a certain result or knowledge of substantial cer-
tainty that  conduct will bring about that result.30  The court in Alvord &
Swift saw things differently, however, drawing a line between a defen-
dant’s actual intent and its constructive intent: “the interference must be
intentional, not merely negligent or incidental to some other, lawful, pur-
pose.”31  Because Alvord had alleged only that NYTC breached its con-
tract with Muller, which incidentally interfered with Alvord’s contract,
24. Alvord & Swift v. Stewart M. Muller Constr. Co., Inc., 385 N.E.2d 1238 (N.Y.
1978).
25. Id. at 1239.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 1240-41.  The court did not explain whether Muller sued Alvord for
breach; it explained only that Muller was insolvent (and therefore unable to pay Alvord’s
additional expenses) and that Alvord alleged that NYTC interfered with Alvord’s contract
with Muller by disrupting Alvord’s construction work.
29. Id. at 1241.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (“intent” requires “that the actor
desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are sub-
stantially certain to result from it”).
31. Alvord & Swift, 385 N.E.2d at 1241 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\3-1\MPE101.txt unknown Seq: 9  4-APR-14 15:46
Fall 2013] A Complete View of the Cathedral 9
Alvord’s claim failed.32  As the court explained, because “there exists . . .
no tort liability to incidental beneficiaries not in privity,” in the absence of
proof that NYTC intended to harm Alvord without justification, Alvord’s
claim must be dismissed.33
Though Alvord & Swift planted the seed, it is, of course, distinguisha-
ble from the circumstances being discussed.  Alvord alleged that NYTC
interfered with Alvord’s performance, not Muller’s—as if the bank inter-
fered with the target’s performance, not the buyer’s.  Further, in contrast
to service contracts, both merger agreements and commitment letters usu-
ally bar any third-party beneficiaries.34
One of New York’s intermediate courts, however, applied Alvord &
Swift’s principles in a case much like our hypothetical.  In Artwear, Inc. v.
Hughes,35 Andy Warhol’s estate signed a contract with Schlaifer Nance &
Company, granting Schlaifer exclusive rights to use and license to others
Warhol’s artwork and trademarks.36  Schlaifer then entered into an agree-
ment with Artwear, granting Artwear a sublicense to manufacture a prod-
uct using Warhol copyrights and trademarks, subject to Schlaifer’s final
approval.37  Schlaifer never approved Artwear’s product, allegedly be-
cause the Estate breached its contract with Schlaifer.38  Artwear brought a
tortious-interference claim against the Estate.  The court dismissed the
claim, stating that Artwear’s claim was “nothing more than a claim for
damages incidentally flowing from the [Estate’s] breach of the license
agreement, to which Artwear was not a party and of which it is not . . . a
third-party beneficiary.”39  In other words, the court explained, Alvord &
Swift was legally indistinguishable.40
In a similar case, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Wometco Theatres,
Inc. v. United Artists Corp.,41 reached the same result as the court in
Artwear.  In Wometco, United Artists agreed to allow Sparks to exhibit
certain United Artist films, and Sparks granted Wometco the right to show
six of those films.42  United Artists then refused to deliver one of the films
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Hexion Specialty Chem. Inc.,
Nimbus Merger Sub Inc. and Huntsman Corp. § 8.6 (July 12, 2007) (“nothing in this Agree-
ment, express or implied, is intended to or shall confer upon any Person other than the par-
ties hereto any right, benefit or remedy of any nature whatsoever”).
35. Artwear, Inc. v. Hughes, 615 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
36. Id. at 690-91.
37. Id. at 691.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 695.
40. Id. See also Highland Capital Mgmt LP v. Schneider, 198 Fed. Appx. 41, 46 (2d Cir.
2006) (stating that defendant did not “procure” the alleged breach of plaintiff’s contract be-
cause defendant did not “prevail upon” an entity to breach its contract with  plaintiff; the
result was incidental to defendant’s conduct).
41. Wometco Theatres, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 186 S.E. 572 (Ga. App. 1935).
42. Id. at 572-73.
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to Sparks and instead entered a contract with another exhibitor to show
the film.43  Sparks was therefore unable to deliver the film to Wometco, in
breach of their agreement.44  Wometco sued United Artists for tortious
interference.
The court rejected Wometco’s claim for the same reasons that pre-
vailed in Artwear:
The mere failure of a party to a contract to carry out its terms will not give rise
to a cause of action ex delicto against it, to a third party who has contracted
with the opposite party to such contract, although in breaching the contract
such person may be charged with notice that the opposite party will not be
able to perform its contract with such third party.45
Because United Artists “merely . . . failed to comply with its contract
with Sparks” and did not “induce[ ] Sparks to break his contract with the
plaintiff,” Wometco’s tortious-interference claim failed.46
Relying on Wometco, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit has concluded that a claim analogous to Wometco’s would not
survive under Illinois law.  In R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics,
Inc.,47 Diasonics contracted to sell medical diagnostic equipment to Davis,
which contracted with two physicians to establish a facility where the phy-
sicians would use the equipment.48  The physicians breached their contract
with Davis to establish this facility, knowing “that their conduct was rea-
sonably certain to cause a breach by Davis of its contract with Diason-
ics[.]”49  Davis, having no need for the equipment, did precisely that.50
Diasonics then sued Davis for breach of contract and the physicians for
tortious interference, alleging that, “the doctors knew of the contract be-
tween Davis and Diasonics and also knew that, if they breached their con-
tract with Davis, Davis would have no use for the equipment it had agreed
to buy from Diasonics.”51
The court dismissed the claim, adopting the reasoning of Wometco.52
Importantly, the court also considered a key factor from Restatement
§ 767: “The fact that . . . interference with the other’s contract was not
desired and was purely incidental in character . . . .”53  Several other courts
have recognized the importance of this factor as well.54
43. Id. at 573.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 574-75.
46. Id. at 575.
47. R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 679.
49. Id. at 685.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 680.
52. Id. at 686-67.
53. R.E. Davis, 826 F.2d at 687.
54. See, e.g., NCC Sunday Inserts, Inc. v. World Color Press, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1004,
1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Connecticut law: “Tortious interference requires more than mere
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Delaware courts have not yet addressed an analogous case, but one
decision is instructive.  In Nelson v. Fleet National Bank,55 Plaza Home
Mortgage Bank (which became Fleet National Bank) employed plaintiffs
Humphries and Nelson and defendant Naworol.56  Naworol allegedly sex-
ually harassed both plaintiffs, solicited negative comments about their
work performances, and ultimately forced Nelson to resign and Hum-
phries to accept an unfavorable employment contract.57  Both Nelson and
Humphries sued Naworol, alleging that he tortiously interfered with their
contracts with Plaza.58
The court explained that Naworol could be held liable for tortious in-
terference only if his conduct was improper.59  It turned to Restatement
§ 767 for guidance and noted that, “[t]hese factors can be summarized by
simply asking ‘whether pursuit of self-interest justified one in inducing an-
other to breach a contract in the particular circumstances.’”60  Addressing
Humphries’ complaint, the court concluded that her allegations supported
the claim that Naworol “acted for reasons other than business concerns[,]”
therefore implying that a defendant’s conduct may be proper if it acts
solely to further its business interests.61  The court denied Naworol’s mo-
tion to dismiss.62
These decisions rest upon at least one of two principles: (1) a defen-
dant does not improperly interfere with another’s contract if the interfer-
ence is incidental to the defendant’s purpose; and (2) a defendant procures
a breach of another’s contract only if it takes affirmative steps to cause
knowledge that one’s actions may cause the breach of an existing contract.”); Johnson &
Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336, 360, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (New Jersey law:
“If the [alleged interference] does not rest upon some legitimate interest or if there is sharp
dealing or overreaching or other conduct below the behavior of fair men similarly situated,
the ensuing loss should be redressed.  Competition and financial self-interest are . . . legiti-
mate interests.”); Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Commercial Servs. Grp, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1015,
1027 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (Iowa law:  “In the case of interference with either an existing or
prospective contract or business relationship, the conduct was not ‘improper’ if it was merely
a consequence of action undertaken for a purpose other than to interfere with a contract.”);
Mann v. GTCR Golder Runner, L.L.C., 483 F. Supp. 2d 864, 871-72 (D. Ariz. 2007) (Arizona
law: same); Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 646 S.E.2d 826, 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (North
Carolina law: “In general, a wrong purpose exists where the act is done other than as a
reasonable and bona fide attempt to protect the interest of the defendant which is involved
. . . . The interference is without justification if the defendants’ motives . . . were not reasona-
bly related to the protection of a legitimate business interest of the defendant.”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
55. Nelson v. Fleet N. Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254 (D. Del. 1996).
56. Id. at 256.
57. Id. at 257-58.
58. Id. at 259-60.
59. Id. at 260.
60. Id. at 260 (quoting Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983,
992 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
61. Nelson, 949 F. Supp. at 260-61.
62. Id. at 264.
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that breach, beyond breaching its own contract.  These cases are most sim-
ilar to our hypothetical and therefore begin to draw the lines we need.
They outline certain facts that may give rise to liability and those that may



























Artwear, Inc. v. Hughes, 202 A.D.2d 76 (1st Dep’t 1994)
Part III explains the reasons that these factually analogous cases de-
serve legally indistinguishable treatment.  First, however, two other cate-
gories of precedents must be addressed.
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2. Only a Stranger can Tortiously Interfere With a Contract
Courts have limited the tortious-inference doctrine in other ways.  Del-
aware, New York, and Georgia, for example, have limited tortious-inter-
ference claims to circumstances where the parties involved are
“strangers”:
Imposition of liability for tortious interference with contractual relationship
requires that the defendant “be a stranger to both the contract and the busi-
ness relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract.” . . . [O]ne need
not be a party to a contract to be deemed not to be a stranger to the contract
. . . .63
For example, under Georgia law, a person is not a stranger to a con-
tract if, among other things, the contract is part and parcel of an interwo-
ven set of relationships or contracts:
[A] defendant is not a “stranger” to a contract or business relationship when[ ]
(1) the defendant is an essential entity to the purported injured relations; (2)
the allegedly injured relations are inextricably a part of or dependent upon
the defendant’s contractual or business relations; (3) the defendant would
benefit economically from the alleged injured relations; or (4) both the defen-
dant and the plaintiff are parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of con-
tracts or relations.64
The Georgia Court of Appeals applied this test in Jefferson-Pilot Com-
munications Co. v. Phoenix City Broadcasting Ltd.65  There, Phoenix City
Broadcasting (“PCB”) entered a purchase agreement to sell a radio sta-
tion to Jefferson-Pilot.66  PCB obtained financing from H.J. Russell so it
could begin building the station (PCB held an FCC permit to build and
operate the station).67  Soon after, H.J. Russell brought in a participating
lender, which signed an agreement with Jefferson-Pilot, PCB, and H.J.
Russell, requiring these entities to notify the lender of any default under
the purchase agreement.68  While the station was being built, Jefferson-
Pilot and PCB disputed who was responsible for certain construction costs,
and Jefferson-Pilot sent a letter to both lenders describing the disagree-
63. Tenneco Auto. Inc. v. El Paso Corp., No. Civ.A. 18810, 2007 WL 92621, at *5-*6 &
n.33 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2007) (quoting Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278,
283 (Ga. 1998)); see also Atlanta Mkt., 503 S.E.2d at 283-84 (“[A]ll partys [sic] to an interwo-
ven contractual arrangement are not liable for tortious interference with any of the contracts
or business relationships.”) (citing Jefferson-Pilot Commc’ns Co. v. Phoenix City Broad., Ltd.
of Atlanta, 421 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)); Koret, Inc. v. Christian Dior, S.A., 554
N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (citing Greyhound Corp. v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co., 19 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940)).
64. Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So.2d 1143, 1156 (Ala.
2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Britt/Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Vandroff Ins. Agency, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1575, 1584 (N.D. Ga. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Jefferson-Pilot, 421 S.E.2d at 298-99.
66. Id. at 297.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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ment.69  Ultimately, Jefferson-Pilot terminated the purchase agreement.70
PCB then sued Jefferson-Pilot for tortiously interfering with PCB and the
lenders’ financing agreement.71
Jefferson-Pilot moved for a directed verdict at trial.  The trial court
denied that motion, but the appellate court reversed.72  It explained that a
non-stranger to an agreement cannot tortiously interfere with it: “[T]he
buyer, seller, and lenders were all parties to a comprehensive interwoven
set of contracts which provided for the financing, construction, and trans-
fer of ownership of the radio station.  Therefore, [Jefferson-Pilot] could
not have tortiously interfered with that contractual relationship between
[PCB] and its lenders.”73  The court observed that Jefferson-Pilot was an
essential party to PCB and the lenders’ financing agreement, even though
it was not bound by it.74
The entities are different, but the analogy leads to the same result.  A
bank, target, and buyer interact frequently through their negotiations of
the merger deal, and their agreements and relationships are plainly inter-
woven.  But it is unclear how firmly this rule would apply: could a bank
escape tort liability under all circumstances, so long as it is deemed a non-
stranger? The decisions that have adopted the doctrine have not gone this
far, perhaps because they have not been presented with the circumstances
to do so.  Nor have they explained the underlying reasons for the non-
stranger doctrine, though it may be that the same intuition that gave rise
to decisions like Artwear also drove the analyses in cases like Jefferson-
Pilot.
3. Economic-Justification Defense
One last doctrine remains, the defense of economic justification.  The
New York State Court of Appeals has recognized the existence of this
defense in response to a claim for tortious interference with contract.  In
White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. v. Cintas Corp.,75 White Plains had
five-year exclusive-service contracts with its customers.76  Cintas knew of
these contracts, and it allegedly induced several of the customers to breach
their contracts with White Plains and sign contracts with Cintas.77  White
Plains sued Cintas for tortious interference, and Cintas raised the defense
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Jefferson-Pilot, 421 S.E.2d at 297.
72. Id. at 299-300.
73. Id. at 299.
74. Id. at 298. The court also concluded that Jefferson-Pilot’s letter to the lenders was
not the proximate cause of the harm to PCB’s financing agreement; it was a secondary reason
why PCB’s claim failed. Id. at 299. See also Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 503
S.E.2d 278, 283-84 (Ga. 1998) (citing Jefferson-Pilot, 421 S.E.2d at 299 with approval).
75. White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. v. Cintas Corp., 867 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 2007).
76. Id. at 382.
77. Id.
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of economic justification: “that it acted to protect its own legal or financial
stake in the breaching party’s business.”78
The court recognized that Cintas could properly raise such a defense.79
The defense failed, however, because Cintas’ alleged justification consti-
tuted only a general economic interest in soliciting business for profit—an
insufficient factual basis for the defense.80
White Plains made clear what would not be a basis for an economic-
justification defense, but it did not explain what would be.  Nearly every
case where the defense has been asserted successfully involved a parent
company asserting the defense after it directed its subsidiary to breach one
of the subsidiary’s contracts.81  The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, however, has suggested that a defendant’s own eco-
nomic interests can justify the interference.  In Don King Productions, Inc.
v. Smith,82 a boxer (Page) entered a four-year exclusive agreement with
Don King Productions (“DKP”), a corporation that promoted boxing
events.83  Page simultaneously entered a managerial contract with Carl
King.84  Shortly thereafter, another boxing manager named Prince alleg-
edly induced Page to breach his promotional and bout agreements.85
Thus, DKP asserted that Prince tortiously interfered with DKP’s contracts
with Page.  In response, Prince raised the economic-interest defense.86
DKP argued that Prince’s defense should fail because Prince was not
acting to protect Page’s economic interests.87  The court found this to be
irrelevant: “[s]uch economic interest . . . is not limited to that of the
breaching party, but can include that of the alleged interferers as well.”88
That is, a defendant need not own the breaching party to raise an eco-
nomic-interest defense.  Rather, the defendant can assert that defense on
its own behalf, when acting in its own interest.89
78. Id. at 383.
79. Id. at 426.
80. Id. at 425.
81. See White Plains, 867 N.E.2d at 426 (citing Ultramar Energy Ltd. v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A., 579 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (stating that defendant’s at-
tempt to protect its security interest “cannot be construed as malicious or carried out with the
intent to harm the plaintiff”)).
82. Don King Prods., Inc. v. Smith, 47 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2002).
83. Id. at 13.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id. at 15.
88. Don King, 47 F. App’x at 15.
89. Id. at 15, 16 n.4.
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Economic justification is a defense, so the defendant bears the burden
to prove it.90  Once it does, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s
interference was either malicious or involved criminal or fraudulent con-
duct.91  For example, in E.F. Hutton International Associates Ltd. v. Shear-
son Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Shearson signed a merger agreement
promising to purchase E.F. Hutton & Co., which had contractual obliga-
tions to provide services to plaintiff E.F. Hutton International.92  Before
the merger occurred, however, Shearson announced that it would reject
plaintiff’s services agreements.93  E.F. Hutton therefore terminated ser-
vices to plaintiff, allegedly negatively affecting plaintiff’s ability to do busi-
ness.94  In plaintiff’s tortious-interference suit against Shearson, the court
held that Shearson did not act maliciously, even if it knew that terminating
plaintiff’s contracts would negatively affect its ability to do business.95
The economic-justification defense thus provides the weakest protec-
tion for a bank.  Although defendants have successfully raised the defense,
courts have generally concluded that existing contracts deserve substantial
protection96 and that one’s own economic interests will rarely justify inter-
ference with another’s executed contract.97
III. ON PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES: AN ECONOMICALLY
EFFICIENT APPROACH
Tortious-interference claims can be defeated.  The above cases begin to
define when they should be.  One may reasonably conclude that these
cases provide sufficient guidance to address the scenario assessed in this
article: the principles seem applicable and the facts appear to be analo-
gous.  Even so, these principles have not stopped commentators from
claiming that a tortious-interference claim against a bank would be via-
ble.98  Nor have they stopped courts from holding that a bank’s effort to
seek a declaration of its rights under a commitment letter would constitute
tortious interference with the target’s merger agreement.99  In the end,
90. See, e.g., Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996) (“To defeat a claim
of tortious interference . . . respondents need to establish that their actions were taken to
protect an economic interest.”).
91. E.F. Hutton Int’l Assocs. Ltd. v. Shearson Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 723
N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (citing Foster, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1996)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 363.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 448-
49 (N.Y. 1980).
97. See, e.g., MLI Indus. Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 613 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
98. Clear Channel: Lessons Learned, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 14. 2008, 11:02
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/clear-channel-lessons-learned/.
99. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Huntsman Corp., 269 S.W.3d 722, 725, 730
(Tex. App. 2008).
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then, the heat of the moment prevails: a court can bend these principles,
because it is easy to distinguish, on the surface, most contracts from a
multi-billion-dollar commitment to lend money.
But these precedents alone do not tell the entire story.  The principles
explained in these precedents stem from at least two sources: (1) the eco-
nomic theory underpinning tort law, and (2) the economic theory under-
pinning the law of remedies.
A. Analyzing the Tort: Has the Bank Acted Intentionally?
In a tortious-interference case, the plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant intentionally caused the breach of the plaintiff’s contract with a third
party.100  Generally, an entity has acted intentionally if its conduct was
designed to bring about a particular result or if it has knowledge of sub-
stantial certainty that acting in a particular way will cause a particular kind
of harm.101  Without question, the bank knows that breaching its contract
with the buyer will require the buyer to breach its contract with the target,
even if the bank does not want this harm to occur.  But the concept of
intent is more complex than this: economic theories of tort law and reme-
dies do not support saddling the bank with tort liability.
Judge Learned Hand famously wrote that one has acted negligently
only if the cost of taking a precaution to avoid the accident (B) was lower
than the probability of injury (P) multiplied by the magnitude of the loss
(L) (i.e., if B < PL).102  For example, assume that a farmer knows that
erecting a wooden fence to confine his cows creates a 10% chance that the
cows will escape and trample a passerby, causing a $100,000 loss.  The ex-
pected accident cost is therefore $10,000 (0.1 x $100,000).  If it would cost
the farmer less than $10,000 to install an electric fence and reduce P to 0,
for example, he should do it.  If he does not, and an accident occurs, the
farmer has acted negligently.
This theory also allows us to distinguish between intentional torts and
unintentional torts.  When the ratio of B to PL is unaffected by the scale of
the potential injurer’s operation, the potential injurer is not an intentional
tortfeasor.103  For example, a railroad that runs several trains per day has
knowledge of substantial certainty that it will kill a certain number of peo-
ple every year in railroad-automobile collisions.104   But we do not hold
the railroad liable as an intentional tortfeasor, because “the same thing
that makes PL high—the scale of the railroad’s operations—also makes B
high.”105  As Judge Richard Posner explains,
100. See Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (N.Y. 1996).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A.
102. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
103. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206 (6th ed. 2003).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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I want a car, and I decide to save time by stealing your car.  B is not only
lower than in an accident case; it is actually a negative number, because rather
than saving resources by injuring the victim (implying a positive B) I would
save resources by not injuring the victim (implying a negative B), since it must
cost me something to steal the car.  (Of course, there is an offsetting gain, or I
would not steal it, but that gain does not represent a net social benefit, be-
cause it is offset by the loss of the car to the victim.)  P, furthermore, is very
high—much higher than in an accident case—because wanting to do someone
an injury makes it much more likely that an injury will occur than if the injury
. . . will simply be an undesired by-product of another activity . . . .106
The bank’s conduct does not meet this test.  The bank has no desire to
harm the target; it makes its decision to lend based on its own economic
interests.  The target incurs harm only when the bank concludes that its
mark-to-market loss on the deal would exceed the cost of breaching its
contract with the buyer.  Thus, P will be low.  Further, because the bank
will breach its contract when performing would be inefficient, the bank
would not save resources by not injuring the target (a negative B), but by
refusing to perform and injuring the target (a positive B).
Nor would awarding tort damages (the value of the thing taken by the
tortfeasor) improve social welfare.  A threat of such liability induces the
bank to spend as much on prevention as it would have spent on perform-
ance, and likely more, given the costs of litigation.  This results in a net
social loss.  In contrast, if the bank faces only expectation damages (in the
buyer’s lawsuit), then the bank will breach only when the benefit of doing
so exceeds the expected loss.  This results in a net social gain, because
damages paid to the buyer will be funneled to the target, and the bank can
both avoid the cost of performance and put the money saved by not per-
forming to a socially beneficial use.
Even if the bank were held liable in tort, punitive damages should be
unavailable.  The gap between PL and B is large in a typical intentional
tort case.107  B will be a negative number (or at least a very low number)
in such a case because the tortfeasor would save resources by not injuring
the victim, and P will be very high because the tortfeasor’s desire to injure
its victim will increase the likelihood of such an injury.    In a case where
the difference between PL and B is small, however, such as a negligence
case or a target’s case against the bank, artificially increasing L within le-
gal limits via punitive damages—which could exceed $50 or $100 billion in
some leveraged buyouts—would force the bank to spend multiples of B to
avoid injuring the target.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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B. Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Target’s Tort Claim
Makes Efficiency an Unattainable Goal
We must, therefore, ask how to remedy the target’s harm.  We can do
so by imposing a liability rule or a property rule.108  As suggested above in
Section III.A. (and considered in detail below in Section IV.A.), awarding
expectation damages (a liability rule) in the buyer’s claim against the bank
is the preferred remedy.
A liability rule protects a property right by compensating the holder
with damages measured under an objective standard of value.109  A prop-
erty rule prohibits a person from taking another’s entitlement to private
property unless the holder sells it willingly for the price at which the other
subjectively values the property.110  In the law of contract remedies, an
order of specific performance creates such a regime.
One reason for choosing a liability rule to protect an entitlement is that
the market cannot efficiently value that entitlement.111  For example, a
liability rule is appropriate in the following scenario.  A factory spews pol-
lutants while manufacturing widgets.  The pollution disturbs hundreds of
nearby landowners; wind patterns carry the pollution across the State.
Thousands are affected.  Any negotiations would be protracted and infi-
nitely complex.  And some individuals would become holdouts, backing
up their unreasonably high settlement demands with a threat to torpedo
the negotiations.  A property rule would require the factory to shut down
completely, or at least for a random period, when the value created by the
factory may exceed the damage done to the landowners.  Protecting the
landowners with a liability rule preserves the factory’s right to operate, but
requires the factory to decide whether the benefits of operating exceed the
costs of damages.  The factory is in the best position to make this calcula-
tion.  Impossible negotiations are avoided.
On the other hand, when the market can accurately and easily value
the entitlement, a property rule will ensure that the parties allocate their
resources efficiently.  As Ronald Coase noted, however, the parties must
be able to identify the person with whom they must negotiate and have
few, if any, incentives to imperil their negotiations.112
Relying on these principles, commentators in favor of applying specific
performance contend that, when parties can renegotiate their existing con-
tract, they should bargain to an efficient outcome when they know that a
court will award specific performance.  Only if the parties are not in such a
position, or if the transaction costs of negotiation would be prohibitively
108. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  This article derives its
title from Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal work.
109. Id. at 1105-06.
110. Id. at 1105.
111. Id. at 1110.
112. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-7 (1960).
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high, should an economic analysis favor money damages.113  Awarding ex-
pectation damages in these circumstances would provide parties with an
incentive to perform when the value of performance exceeds the costs and
to breach in the opposite circumstances.  The threat of a court order of
specific performance—which would be insensitive to the costs of perform-
ance—would not skew the breaching party’s calculations.114
Applying these principles here should be easy.  The buyer and bank
have already negotiated a commitment letter.  They are repeat players in
the market and have reputations to preserve.  Indeed, the course of deal-
ing between a buyer and the bank often includes restructuring the terms of
the bank’s contract when significant changes in the market make it neces-
sary to modify the deal.  Renegotiation is a feasible and preferable option.
Importantly, their economic interests are aligned, at least in part.  A bank
is no more interested in lending money to a buyer who will acquire a
troubled target than the buyer is interested in purchasing a troubled tar-
get.  Enforcing the parties’ bargain with a property rule should therefore
facilitate a Pareto-optimal outcome.115  The bank will buy the buyer’s
right to an order of specific performance if doing so will be cheaper than
the cost of performance.116  In other words, the bank will breach its com-
mitment letter if the mark-to-market losses on the loan are significantly
greater than the cost of purchasing the buyer’s right to specific perform-
ance.  The law encourages efficient breach.
But a target’s tort suit against the bank makes these renegotiations im-
possible because any evidence of such negotiations will be the centerpiece
of the target’s claim for tortious interference with contract.
C. The Target’s Tort Claim Increases the Costs of Negotiating a
Commitment Letter and Eliminates the Bank’s Incentive to Renegotiate
the Terms of Its Commitment in Economically Efficient Ways
that Do Not Affect the Target
Pre-dispute negotiations between a bank and a buyer occur in at least
two stages.  The parties first negotiate a commitment letter, which sets
forth the terms on which the bank or syndicate of banks will finance the
113. See Nathan Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2020, 2028 (2009).
114. See id. at 2029 (generally describing this analysis). See also ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 216, 233 (2d ed. 1997) (“In order for the promisor to
internalize the benefits of precaution, he or she must pay full compensation to the promisee
for breach.”).
115. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (abr. 9th ed. 2010) (“Pareto optimality” is
“[a]n economic situation in which no person can be made better off without making someone
else worse off.”).
116. Of course, this analysis addresses only part of the issue.  Courts have generally
concluded that they will not specifically enforce a promise to lend money. See 25 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 67:90 (4th ed. 2013) (“By the more traditional view, equity will not specifi-
cally enforce contracts to lend or borrow money, except under extraordinary
circumstances.”).
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buyer’s deal.  Although a commitment letter represents the bank’s binding
commitment, changes in the market may spur a new stage of negotiations.
The typical course of dealing between a buyer and the bank often includes
restructuring the terms of the bank’s commitment.  The bank and buyer
understand that the buyer will be flexible when significant changes in the
market make it necessary to modify the deal.  A target’s suit against the
bank will make the first stage of negotiations costly; it will prevent the
second stage of negotiations from happening altogether.
Certain terms of commitment letters will be subject to substantially
more scrutiny.  A prime example is the inclusion of additional closing con-
ditions, such as pro-forma leverage conditions.  Parties may invest signifi-
cant time developing such conditions.  For example, the agreement may
require that the consolidated EBITDA of the buyer and its subsidiaries, as
set forth in certain pro-forma financial statements, be greater than a cer-
tain stated amount.  The bank may require that the qualified cash of cer-
tain loan parties not fall below a certain minimum threshold.  It may
provide that the arrangers of the debt be reasonably satisfied that, after
giving pro-forma effect to the transactions, the amount of indebtedness
outstanding on the closing date meets certain debt-to-consolidated
EBITDA ratios for certain quarters.  Alternatively, the bank may require
that the consolidated EBITDA for a certain period be greater than a cer-
tain amount—a requirement that may cause the buyer to play hardball to
exclude the consolidated EBITDA for certain windows within that period.
Crafting these provisions takes time, both in separately calculating the
leverage ratios that meet each party’s needs and in negotiating and finaliz-
ing the provisions, including any carve-outs, in a way that satisfies each
party.  Even after extensive negotiations, these calculations and provisions
do not provide fail-safe protection against economically inefficient deals.
While pro-forma leverage conditions may provide substantial protection,
the conditions under which the bank would close a deal often change as
the future unfolds.  A general decline in economic activity may drain
smaller banks of their cash and thereby freeze the secondary loan market.
These smaller banks may demand substantially better terms than origi-
nally provided, making the loans difficult or impossible to syndicate.  The
loans then sit on the bank’s books, tying up cash it did not anticipate oper-
ating without.
These are precisely the circumstances in which the bank and the buyer
would want to renegotiate their deal.  The terms of the bank’s commit-
ment to the buyer would not affect the target, having already accepted its
merger consideration, but would provide the bank with the loan terms it
needs to syndicate the debt.  For example, a bank may promise to advance
a bridge loan to a buyer in exchange for the buyer’s promise to issue secur-
ities of the new entity a certain period after the loan is made, which securi-
ties the bank would resell to the market.  That promise may include a
condition that the securities’ aggregate weighted average total effective
yields may not exceed certain rates.  In a difficult market, the underwriters
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may need to offer the securities at a discount.  If the underwriters absorb
the cost of offering the securities at a discount, however, such a sale should
not negatively impact the buyer’s economic position.  In other words, such
a cap on effective yields would limit the buyer’s payment obligations, but
would not preclude the underwriters from selling to the market at a dis-
count.  On the other hand, precluding the underwriters from selling to the
market at a discount would effectively require them to hold the loan at an
even greater economic cost than the sale of discounted notes, without any
corresponding benefit to the buyer.
Alternatively, the bank may instead forgo a piece of its compensation
for underwriting the securities, or it may give up its right to make a securi-
ties demand on more than one occasion.  Again, the buyer may agree to
amend the parties’ agreement to allow the bank to offer discounted notes
to the market, so long as it accepts the cost of selling the discounted notes.
Or, perhaps, the buyer may share in some of the bank’s pain.
The bank and buyer might also agree to strip certain financial cove-
nants from the commitment or include call protection, which would pro-
hibit the buyer from calling back the securities for a certain period after
their issuance.
In addition to provisions that may be (relatively) seamlessly renegoti-
ated, several provisions exist in merger agreements that can give a bank
significant trouble when it wishes to renegotiate its commitment.  Commit-
ment letters may directly address these provisions, or, if possible, may re-
quire the bank to negotiate with the buyer about those terms before the
parties sign the merger agreement.  For example, a merger agreement may
require the buyer to take all actions necessary or advisable to consummate
the financing on terms and conditions described in the commitment letter,
including bringing suit against the bank if necessary.  Huntsman and Hex-
ion’s agreement had such a provision.117  It is often difficult to win a spe-
cific-performance claim seeking to force a contracting party to bring a
lawsuit, even when the contract requires the party to exercise its reasona-
ble best efforts to close the deal.  A provision requiring a party to take all
actions necessary to close the deal certainly takes some guesswork out of
the equation.  In doing so, however, it also destroys the common goal be-
tween a buyer and the bank of completing an economically sound
transaction.
In any event, as explained in the next section, even without the threat
of the target’s tortious-interference claim, there is a significant chance that
the parties would never bargain to an efficient outcome under a property
rule because the buyer would only use specific performance as a means to
exert bargaining leverage over and extort undue concessions from the
117. Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Hexion Specialty Chem. Inc., Nimbus
Merger Sub Inc. and Huntsman Corp. § 5.12(a) (July 12, 2007) (providing that Hexion “shall
use its reasonable best efforts to take, or cause to be taken, all actions and to do, or cause to
be done, all things necessary, proper or advisable to arrange and consummate the Financing
on the terms and conditions described in the Commitment Letter”).
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bank.  Thus, in addition to its increased costs and rigidity, specific per-
formance is much more likely to lead to inefficient overperformance.  For
these reasons, awarding expectation damages in the buyer’s claim against
the bank, which will flow to the target, is generally the preferred remedy.
IV. SOLUTIONS
A. A Liability Rule Should Apply in the Buyer’s Case Against the Bank,
Unless the Bank’s Breach Is Opportunistic
The choice of remedy for the bank’s breach is not clear-cut.  On the
one hand, specific performance ensures that the buyer receives the full
benefit of its bargain with the bank and that the bank does not attempt to
breach opportunistically, hoping to pay damages below the cost of per-
formance.118  Where performance is efficient (i.e., the benefits of perform-
ing exceed the costs) and damages are lower than the cost of performance,
under a liability rule a risk exists that performance will not occur.119  Spe-
cific performance is beneficial because it deters this type of un-
derperformance.  On the other hand, specific performance encourages
overperformance by preventing breaches where it would be more efficient
for the bank not to perform.120  “The relative importance of these two
concerns—the tendency for underperformance arising from money dam-
ages versus . . . potential for overperformance with specific performance—
determine[s] whether specific performance or damages should be the gen-
erally preferred remedy.”121  In the high-stakes world of LBOs, where bil-
lions of dollars are on the line and markets change on a dime,122 the risk
of overperformance is simply too great.  Because imposing a liability re-
gime minimizes this risk and incentivizes the bank—the party with the
most information—to find the best use of its money (i.e., to breach only
where it is efficient to do so), this article advocates applying expectation
damages to the buyer’s claim against the bank.
An “expectation-damages” rule encourages efficient breach:
A rule that awards expectation damages generally ensures that a breach will
occur only when the breach is efficient.  If the promisor breaches knowing
118. Yair Listokin, The Empirical Case for Specific Performance: Evidence from the
IBP-Tyson Litigation, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 469, 470 (2005), available at http://dig-
italcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/568.
119. Id.
120. Id. (“A specific performance remedy when breach is efficient, however, necessi-
tates costly bargaining to arrive at efficient nonperformance.  If bargaining fails, then specific
performance causes overperformance.”).
121. Id.
122. Expectation damages provide flexibility to deal with rapidly changing market con-
ditions. See, e.g., Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1982) (“One significant asset of the current system of money
damages is its ability to respond satisfactorily to the varied . . . economic considerations
relevant to difficult contract cases.  Much of this flexibility and responsiveness is likely to be
lost if specific performance becomes the paradigmatic remedy for breach of contract.”).
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that he must compensate the promisee, breach is presumably efficient since
the promisor would not breach unless his gain from not performing exceeds
the compensation he must pay [the] promisee for the loss of his bargain.
Thus, a rule that awards expectation damages generally ensures that breach
will occur only if breach is, in economic terms, Pareto-superior to perform-
ance: the promisor is better off, and the promisee no worse off, as a result of
breach.123
In addition, applying expectation damages prevents the buyer from using
the specific performance remedy as a means to gain bargaining leverage
over the bank.  It also decreases negotiation costs, both ex ante and ex
post.  Accordingly, only if the buyer can show that the bank’s breach is
opportunistic should the court order specific performance.  The case for
specific performance when breach is opportunistic is strengthened when
alternative financing is unavailable.
What is an “efficient” breach and how does a liability rule encourage
that result?  Imagine a seller who has contracted to deliver widgets in two
weeks to a buyer who agreed to pay the seller $10,000.  After one week,
another buyer comes along who is willing to pay $20,000 for the widgets.
If the original buyer covers for $15,000 by purchasing substitute widgets
elsewhere, the seller must pay expectation damages of $5,000 ($15,000
cover price - $10,000 original purchase price).  Because the seller’s legal
obligation is limited to paying expectation damages, it is better off by
$5,000: $20,000 (new purchase price) - $5,000 (damages) = $15,000, which
is $5,000 greater than the original purchase price of $10,000.  At the same
time, the seller has fully compensated the original buyer for its harm, and
the widgets have been allocated to the party who values them the greatest.
The most efficient result has been reached.  This result is possible only
where expectation damages are employed: had the seller been ordered to
specifically perform, it would have been $5,000 poorer and the goods
would not have reached their optimal destination.
The efficient breach theory—advocating expectation damages to en-
courage breach where the profit to the promisor exceeds the loss to the
promisee—is rooted in the teaching of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who, when
dismissing the application of moral ideals to the law of contracts, stated
the following: “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a pre-
diction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing
else.”124  As Judge Henry Friendly clarified in Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune
Star, Holmes’ rule is grounded in the economic principle that an inten-
tional breach may be efficient because it creates a net benefit to society:
Under Holmes’ theory that a contract is simply a set of alternative promises
either to perform or to pay damages for nonperformance . . . the rule would
require no other explanation . . . . [B]reaches of contract that are in fact effi-
cient and wealth-enhancing should be encouraged[.] . . . [S]uch “efficient
123. Id. at 1394.
124. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (emphasis
added).
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breaches” occur when the breaching party will still profit after compensating
the other party for its “expectation interest.”125
Judge Posner, perhaps the greatest champion of the efficient-breach
theory, offered a similar characterization of Holmes’ rule:
[Holmes] thought of contracts as options—when you sign a contract in which
you promise a specified performance (supplying a product, or providing a ser-
vice) you buy an option to perform or pay damages . . . . As long as you pay
the damages awarded by the court in the promisee’s suit for breach of contract
. . . no blame can attach to your not performing even if it was deliberate—
even if, for example, you did not perform simply because someone offered
you more money for the product or service that you had undertaken to supply
in the contract and you did not have enough capacity to supply both the prom-
isee and the new, more necessitous customer.  You have not really broken
your promise, because what you promised (though that is not how the con-
tract will have been worded) was either-or: not performance but either per-
formance or compensation for the cost of nonperformance to the other party
to the contract.126
Judge Posner regards expectation damages, not specific performance, to
be the preferred remedy, because “a general entitlement to specific per-
formance would thwart some efficient breaches.”127  Judge Posner offers
the following example to illustrate this point:
If A breaks his contract with B to sell to C because C will pay more than the
harm (which equals damages) to B from the breach, the breach increases the
social product: B is no worse off, and A and C are both better off.  But if B is
entitled to specific performance, A cannot sell to C without paying B to agree
to terminate A’s contract with him, creating a bilateral-monopoly situation
. . . .128
Judge Posner’s reasoning in a case with facts roughly analogous to
those considered in this article (i.e., a change in market conditions render-
ing performance uneconomical and inefficient) illustrates why, under most
circumstances, the bank should not be made to specifically perform its fi-
nancing commitment in the face of changing economic circumstances, but
should instead have to pay only expectation damages.  In North Indiana
Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., Judge Posner considered
whether specific performance was necessary to enforce a 20-year agree-
ment by NIPSCO, a public utility in Indiana, to purchase coal from Car-
bon County.129  During the course of performance, the price of electricity
dropped such that NIPSCO could purchase it for less than the cost of gen-
erating electricity from coal.130  NIPSCO stopped accepting coal deliveries
125. Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
126. Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1349, 1350 (2009) [hereinafter Posner, Contract Breaker] (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 1350-51.
128. Id. at 1351.
129. See generally N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
130. Id. at 267.
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and sought a declaration excusing it from purchasing coal.131  Carbon
County counter-claimed for specific performance.132  Carbon County won
damages at trial, and both parties appealed.133  On appeal, Judge Posner
found that the request for specific performance had no merit and upheld
the damages award for two reasons: (1) breach was efficient, and (2)
awarding specific performance would only serve to give Carbon County
undue bargaining leverage.134
In finding that an order of specific performance would impose costs on
society greater than the benefits, Judge Poser reasoned as follows:
Indeed, specific performance would be improper as well as unnecessary here,
because it would force the continuation of production that has become un-
economical.  No one wants coal from Carbon County’s mine.  With the col-
lapse of oil prices, which has depressed the price of substitute fuels as well,
this coal costs far more to get out of the ground than it is worth in the market.
Continuing to produce it, under compulsion of an order for specific perform-
ance, would impose costs on society greater than the benefits.  NIPSCO’s
breach, though it gave Carbon County a right to damages, was an efficient
breach in the sense that it brought to a halt a production process that was no
longer cost-justified.  The reason why NIPSCO must pay Carbon County’s
loss is not that it should have continued buying coal it didn’t need but that the
contract assigned to NIPSCO the risk of market changes that made continued
deliveries uneconomical.  The judgment for damages is the method by which
that risk is being fixed on NIPSCO in accordance with its undertakings.135
Moreover, Judge Posner found that an award of specific performance
would likely never be implemented and refused to let Carbon County use
specific performance to gain a bargaining advantage:
With continued production uneconomical, it is unlikely that an order of spe-
cific performance, if made, would ever actually be implemented.  If, as a find-
ing that the breach was efficient implies, the cost of a substitute supply
(whether of coal, or of electricity) to NIPSCO is less than the cost of produc-
ing coal from Carbon County’s mine, NIPSCO and Carbon County can both
be made better off by negotiating a cancellation of the contract and with it a
dissolution of the order of specific performance.  Suppose, by way of example,
that Carbon County’s coal costs $20 a ton to produce, that the contract price is
$40, and that NIPSCO can buy coal elsewhere for $10.  Then Carbon County
would be making a profit of only $20 on each ton it sold to NIPSCO ($40-
131. Id. at 267-68.
132. Id. at 268.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 279-80.
135. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 279 (internal citations omitted). See also Wal-
green Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 274 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Sara Creek
reminds us that damages are the norm in breach of contract as in other cases.  Many
breaches, it points out, are ‘efficient’ in the sense that they allow resources to be moved into
a more valuable use.  Perhaps this is one—the value of Phar–Mor’s occupancy of the anchor
premises may exceed the cost to Walgreen of facing increased competition.  If so, society will
be better off if Walgreen is paid its damages, equal to that cost, and Phar–Mor is allowed to
move in rather than being kept out by an injunction.”) (internal citation omitted).
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$20), while NIPSCO would be losing $30 on each ton it bought from Carbon
County ($40-$10).  Hence by offering Carbon County more than contract
damages (i.e., more than Carbon County’s lost profits), NIPSCO could induce
Carbon County to discharge the contract and release NIPSCO to buy cheaper
coal.  For example, at $25, both parties would be better off than under specific
performance, where Carbon County gains only $20 but NIPSCO loses $30.
Probably, therefore, Carbon County is seeking specific performance in order
to have bargaining leverage with NIPSCO, and we can think of no reason why
the law should give it such leverage.  We add that if Carbon County obtained
and enforced an order for specific performance this would mean that society
was spending $20 (in our hypothetical example) to produce coal that could be
gotten elsewhere for $10—a waste of scarce resources.136
Other commentators have similarly found that specific performance
encourages inefficient stratagem:
An occasional promisee will request specific performance to satisfy a seem-
ingly irrational motive, such as spite or vindictiveness, especially if the prom-
isee has engaged in a long, rancorous, and ultimately fruitless attempt to
convince the promisor to perform.  More common, perhaps, than the spiteful
promisee will be the promisee who requests specific performance primarily to
warn other promisors who are tempted to breach that he will demand specific
relief if they fail to perform.  In such cases, the benefit that the promisee seeks
from specific performance is not so much compensation for the loss of his
bargain with the promisor as deterrence of subsequent promisors from breach.
In short, . . . certain promisees may abuse [the right to specific performance]
. . . to further impure, non-compensatory motives.137
Thus, not only would the application of expectation damages en-
courage efficient breach, it also would prevent the buyer from inefficiently
seeking specific performance for the sole purpose of selling that right back
to the bank.
136. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 279-80. See also Walgreen Co., 966 F.2d at 276
(“The lack of alternatives in bilateral monopoly creates a bargaining range, and the costs of
negotiating to a point within that range may be high.  Suppose the cost to Walgreen of facing
the competition of Phar–Mor at the Southgate Mall would be $1 million, and the benefit to
Sara Creek of leasing to Phar–Mor would be $2 million.  Then at any price between those
figures for a waiver of Walgreen’s injunctive right both parties would be better off, and we
expect parties to bargain around a judicial assignment of legal rights if the assignment is
inefficient.  But each of the parties would like to engross as much of the bargaining range as
possible—Walgreen to press the price toward $2 million, Sara Creek to depress it toward $1
million.  With so much at stake, both parties will have an incentive to devote substantial
resources of time and money to the negotiation process.  The process may even break down,
if one or both parties want to create for future use a reputation as a hard bargainer; and if it
does break down, the injunction will have brought about an inefficient result.”) (internal
citation omitted); Posner, Contract Breaker, supra note 126, at 1353 (“Of course the three
parties involved might bargain their way out of the situation.  But that would be a costly
bargaining because of the bilateral-monopoly setting.  The promisor could get out of the
contract only by negotiating with the promisee, and the promisee could extract concessions
from the promisor only by negotiating with him.  Each party would be pushing to maximize
his share of the surplus value that the breach would enable, and such a negotiation is costly
and may fail.  If it fails, the surplus is lost, and that is a social and not merely a private cost.”).
137. Yorio, supra note 122, at 1373.
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1. Specific Performance Increases Costs and Lowers
Joint Contractual Value
In addition to incentivizing efficient breach and discouraging games-
manship, applying expectation damages (a liability rule) minimizes negoti-
ation and monitoring costs and maximizes joint contractual value.  Specific
performance (a property rule), on the other hand, results in a variety of
inefficiencies.  It “increase[es] the costs of contractual negotiations, by in-
creasing postbreach transaction costs, and by generating additional admin-
istrative costs in fashioning specific performance decrees and in
monitoring performance by promisors.”138  Specific performance also in-
volves disadvantages that lower joint contractual value (i.e., “the value
gained by the parties less any expenses, costs of bargaining, and risk-asso-
ciated disutility”) by requiring inefficient performance and leading parties
to take unnecessary steps to avoid that risk.139  Thus, “[w]hatever effi-
ciency gains might be generated by specific performance would almost
surely be outweighed by these losses, and could in any event be achieved
within a money damages system.”140
First, by reflecting the relative ex ante preferences of the parties—i.e.,
the bank obviously prefers expectation damages because they allow maxi-
mum flexibility and permit the bank to breach when it is efficient to do so,
while the buyer should be indifferent because money is not unique and an
active market of substitute goods exists—a liability rule “mirror[s] the typ-
ical solution that the parties would arrange for themselves . . . and thereby
reduces the costs of contractual negotiations.”141  A right to specific per-
formance provides the buyer with veto power to prevent the bank from
breaching.  In order for the bank to effect an efficient breach, it has to
bribe the buyer for a contractual release, resulting in more complex and
strategic negotiations than if specific performance were not permitted.142
Second, the availability of the specific performance remedy negatively
affects bargaining conditions by interjecting moral considerations that de-
tract from the buyer’s ability to make economically rational decisions:
First, instead of viewing contractual rights as a means to an end, a legal rem-
edy itself may create intrinsic value in carrying out contractual promises.  Sec-
ond, by boosting the salience of performance, a specific performance default
may cause [a buyer] to insist on performance even when it is in [its] material
interest to accept the efficient breach.  Third, when specific performance has
an expressive effect on the moral intuitions of [the buyer], the resulting oppo-
sition to breach increases the burden on [the bank] when they negotiate to
obtain release from inefficient contractual obligations . . . . In other words, by
138. Id. at 1388.
139. Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An
Economic Analysis, 84 TEX. L. REV. 831, 832-33 (2006).
140. Yorio, supra note 122, at 1388.
141. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1380.
142. Ben Depoorter & Stephan Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The Ex-
pressive Effect of Specific Performance, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 685 (2012).
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fueling [the buyer’s] moral aversion to breach, specific performance might
lead parties into conflict rater [sic] than negotiation.143
The “trigger[ing] [of] such deontological moral viewpoints about contract
performance” makes “efficient breach . . . more difficult” by “compli-
cat[ing] private bargaining and the attainment of economically maximizing
transactions.”144
Third, postbreach negotiations are more costly when a specific per-
formance remedy is applied.145  Under specific performance, any
postbreach negotiations between [the buyer] and [the bank] over [the bank’s]
profit from breach represent a “dead-weight” efficiency loss, which serves
only to transfer wealth from [the bank] to [the buyer] without generating ad-
ditional social wealth.  These negotiations are likely to be protracted and
costly both because [the buyer] may be unsure what [the bank’s] profit from
breach is and because [the bank] will try hard to keep as much of [its] profit as
[it] can.146
While there are still postbreach negotiation costs associated with ex-
pectation damages, those costs are “likely to be lower than those gener-
ated by a specific performance rule, since damages are normally easy to
determine and since [the bank] will be anxious to pay quickly to avoid the
attorney’s fees accompanying a lawsuit.”147
The following three examples illustrate that increased postbreach bar-
gaining costs accompany the specific performance remedy under most
circumstances:
In the first common scenario, a [bank] breaches because [it] believes—
wrongly, it turns out—that the buyer has no contractual claim.  Given the
[bank’s] convictions, [it] will reject any claim to recovery.  Negotiations are
likely to be strenuous and complicated, and will be especially difficult if the
buyer seeks to share in the profits . . . above the alleged contract price or if the
buyer insists upon specific performance of an obligation denied by the other
party.
In the second case, the [bank] breaches because of factors peculiar to [its] own
operations . . . . In this case, there is no opportunity gain for the parties to
negotiate over . . . . Moreover, although the [bank] may be willing to admit
some monetary liability to the buyer, [it] is likely to be particularly resistant to
a demand by the buyer for specific performance in light of [its] personal diffi-
culties in performing.  Thus, the availability of specific performance is likely to
complicate the negotiating process.
143. Id. at 680; see also id. at 689 (“If a specific performance as a default remedy pro-
vokes moral aversion against breach, promisors face a steeper challenge when negotiating to
obtain release from inefficient contractual obligations.  They must compensate the promisee
not only for the material losses, but they must also obtain forgiveness for violating the statu-
tory entitlement to performance.  Contract breach might be perceived as an insult that can-
not as easily be absolved by material compensation.”).
144. Id. at 716.
145. Yorio, supra note 122, at 1381.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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In the third case, the existence of a contract is uncontested and the [bank] has
no personal justification for not performing, but [it] may nevertheless breach
because of a sudden [change in market conditions], which then remain[ ] sta-
ble until the date of performance.  In this scenario, both specific performance
and the current money damages rule enable the buyer to deprive the [bank] of
whatever gain [it] may be able to realize from breach, should the buyer choose
to press [its] legal claim.  Under either remedial rule, the [bank] has a strong
incentive to avoid a lawsuit by delivering substitute [financing].  Thus, the fact
that the [bank] has not delivered suggests that high cover costs may make it
difficult for [it] to cover in the market.  If so, the availability of specific per-
formance is likely to increase transaction costs by forcing the [bank] to [cover]
in the market.148
Fourth, expanding the availability of specific performance would in-
crease administrative costs because “granting specific performance itself
consumes considerable resources in tailoring the terms of the decree and
in supervising performance by the [bank].”149  Once specific performance
is granted, “the court must ensure that the stipulated performance is ac-
complished, meaning that the court must be able to ascertain the quality of
performance to guard against its being inadequate.”150  To enforce expec-
tation damages, by contrast, “courts do not have to assess and oversee the
quality of performance, for by hypothesis there is no performance.”151
The costs associated with crafting and enforcing a specific performance
remedy will therefore “usually exceed the costs of devising and enforcing a
damages judgment.”152
Finally, specific performance involves several disadvantages that lower
joint contractual value: the bank might have to perform even when doing
so is inefficient; the increased costs associated with specific performance
might lead the bank to take wasteful avoidance steps (such as entering into
inefficient hedging transactions); and the possibility of having to pay a
large sum for a release (or worse, of actually having to perform) if per-
formance would be inefficient constitutes an undesirable risk for the
bank.153  These disadvantages will not arise when a liability rule is applied:
“Under the expectation measure, if it were very expensive to perform, [the
bank] could, and usually would, breach and pay damages rather than per-
form . . . Thus, [the bank] would not be forced to perform and ordinarily
would avoid more than modest bargaining costs, would not be induced to
spend wastefully on avoidance steps, and would not bear risk beyond that
of expectation damages.”154
148. Id. at 1382-83.
149. Id. at 1386.
150. Shavell, supra note 139, at 845. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
& UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011) (“Specific performance may appear impractical, or too
difficult to enforce.”).
151. Shavell, supra note 139, at 846.
152. Yorio, supra note 122, at 1386.
153. Shavell, supra note 139, at 833.
154. Id.
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2. Specific Performance Is Appropriate Where Breach Is Opportunistic
and Alternative Financing Is Unavailable
Not all breaches are efficient, however.  Some are opportunistic.155
And to those breaches, specific performance should apply.  This is so be-
cause, unlike efficient breach, which increases the size of the economic pot
by allowing the promisor to reap a greater profit while fully compensating
the promisee, opportunistic breach only redistributes wealth from the
promisee to the promisor (i.e., it does not increase the size of the pot).
Making an opportunistic breacher pay only expectation damages will not
discourage this type of behavior: if the breacher is caught and held liable it
will be in the exact same position as if its breach were efficient.  In order
to incentivize breach only where it is efficient and to adequately deter op-
portunism, the punishment for opportunistic breach must be more severe
than for efficient breach.  Specific performance should be the preferred
remedy.  As Judge Posner stated, ‘[i]t makes a difference in deciding which
remedy to grant whether the breach was opportunistic.  If a promisor
breaks his promise merely to take advantage of the vulnerability of the
promisee . . . we might as well throw the book at the promisor.”156  Thus,
under the circumstances considered in this article, the bank should have to
specifically perform if it breaches opportunistically.
For example, in IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the court’s decision to
award specific performance turned, at least in part, on Tyson’s opportunis-
tic breach of its merger agreement with IBP.157  Tyson, the nation’s largest
chicken distributor, entered into a merger agreement to acquire IBP, the
nation’s number one beef and number two pork distributor.  The goal of
this horizontal merger was to achieve product diversification and syner-
gies: “to create the world’s preeminent meat products company—a com-
pany that would dominate the meat cases of supermarkets in the United
States and eventually throughout the globe.”158  During the  auction pro-
cess, Tyson learned that there was accounting fraud at DFG, a small IBP
subsidiary.  But news of the fraud did not extinguish Tyson’s fire for IBP.
To the contrary, Tyson increased its bid after learning of the fraud.  Ty-
son’s perseverance paid off, and it won the auction.
After executing the merger agreement, however, both Tyson and IBP
began to struggle financially, “due in large measure to a severe winter,
which adversely affected livestock supplies and vitality.  As these struggles
deepened, Tyson’s desire to buy IBP weakened.”159  Using the problems
155. E.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Not all
breaches of contract are involuntary or otherwise efficient.  Some are opportunistic; the
promisor wants the benefit of the bargain without bearing the agreed-upon cost, and exploits
the inadequacies of purely compensatory remedies . . . .”).
156. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8 (5th ed. 1998) (emphasis
added).
157. IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
158. Id. at 22.
159. Id.
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at DFG (including the resolution of a SEC investigation) as an excuse,
Tyson delayed the merger.  Tyson’s delay tactics did not fool the court,
which characterized the true reason for slowing down the merger process
as “buyer’s regret.”160  “While Tyson still believed that the deal made stra-
tegic sense, it was keen on finding a way to consummate the deal at a
lower price.  The negotiations with the SEC [regarding DFG] were a pres-
sure point that Tyson could use for that purpose and it did.”161  Put differ-
ently, “Tyson was . . . bent on using its leverage to extract concessions from
IBP.”162  As conditions continued to deteriorate, Tyson got cold feet and
ultimately decided to abandon the merger.  Thereafter, IBP filed an action
seeking specific performance.
In granting IBP’s request for specific performance, the court concluded
that the deal still made sense and that Tyson should not be allowed to take
advantage of IBP’s vulnerability to negotiate a lower purchase price:
“[T]here is no doubt that a remedy of specific performance is practicable.
Tyson itself admits that the combination still makes strategic sense. . . .
Tyson Foods is still interested in purchasing IBP, but wants to get its origi-
nal purchase price back and then buy IBP off the day-old goods table.”163
The application of specific performance to instances of opportunistic
breach by a bank in the LBO context is particularly appropriate where
alternative means of financing are not available.  For example, in BT
Triple Crown Merger Co., Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., defend-
ants—a consortium of lenders including Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Credit
Suisse, The Royal Bank of Scotland, Wachovia, and Deutsche Bank enti-
ties—agreed to lend plaintiffs, which were controlled by Bain Capital
Partners and Thomas H. Lee Partners, approximately $22 billion to fi-
nance the leveraged buyout of the media company Clear Channel.164  As
the credit markets worsened in the summer of 2007, defendants allegedly
developed a case of lenders’ remorse and “plotted to shift about $2.65
billion of losses to [plaintiffs] or to escape their commitment.”165  Specifi-
cally, plaintiffs alleged that defendants attempted to take advantage of the
market conditions and plaintiffs’ resulting vulnerability in order to “wrest
concessions from [them] or prevent them from completing the Acquisition
by (1) threatening to back out of another unrelated loan to [plaintiffs], (2)
meeting with [plaintiffs] . . . to ask them, with hat in hand, to change the
terms of the financing, (3) stalling to buy time to delay the transaction, and
160. Id.
161. Id. at 47.
162. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
163. IBP, 789 A.2d at 83 (emphasis added).  Note that Tyson was offering IBP share-
holders a choice of cash or Tyson stock, which allowed the shareholders the chance to share
in the upside of the new combined company.  Thus, the court also relied on this fact to sup-
port the inadequacy of damages as a remedy. Id.
164. BT Triple Crown Merger Co., Inc. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 08-600899,
2008 WL 1970900, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 7, 2008).
165. Id. (alteration in original omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\3-1\MPE101.txt unknown Seq: 33  4-APR-14 15:46
Fall 2013] A Complete View of the Cathedral 33
(4) failing to negotiate the final transaction agreements in good faith and
instead asking for unreasonable terms.”166  Plaintiffs then filed an action
seeking specific performance of defendants’ commitment to finance the
deal, and defendants moved for summary judgment.
In support of their request for specific performance, plaintiffs argued
that it was commercially impossible to borrow the $22 billion from another
group of lenders; the leveraged financing of the magnitude needed to com-
plete the transaction was simply not available in the market because of the
credit crisis (i.e., no other group of lenders was able to consummate the
deal).167  As such, if defendants were allowed to breach, plaintiffs would
be unable to complete the Clear Channel acquisition.168  The court ac-
cepted plaintiffs’ argument and denied defendants’ motion, because it was
unable to determine “whether alternate financing c[ould] be procured for
the Acquisition[.]”169
B. The Bank Should Be Liable for Tortious Interference if it
Intentionally Causes a Wrongful Breach of Contract
or its Conduct Is Independently Unlawful
As explained in this article, contract law does encourage efficient
breach.  We want to direct goods and services into the hands of those who
will pay the most for them, presumably because those who pay more can
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at *9 (Plaintiffs presented expert testimony that, “[g]iven the ongoing instabil-
ity in leveraged loan markets, the uncertainty in the market about when the credit crisis will
end and where the economy is headed, the size of the [defendants’ facility under the Com-
mitment Letter], and the absence of any large new leveraged loans being brought to market,
. . . it would be a practical impossibility under current market conditions for the Purchasers to
replace [the defendants’ facility] with a new group of lenders on terms remotely similar to
those in the Commitment Letter.”)
168. Plaintiffs argued that they fell within an exception to the general rule that
“[o]rdinarily, the New York courts will not order specific performance of a contract to lend
money to a plaintiff, on the ground that money is fungible, and an injured party can borrow
funds elsewhere and recover damages based on the higher costs it was forced to pay to the
replacement lender.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).  Note that plain-
tiffs’ argument is not novel, as other courts have granted specific performance of contracts to
lend money where an alternative source of financing is unavailable. See First Nat’l State
Bank of N.J. v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Norristown, 610 F.2d 164, 173 (3d
Cir. 1979) (affirming order of specific performance where “there is no hope of obtaining
similar financing”) (internal quotations omitted); Bregman v. Meehan, 479 N.Y.S.2d 422, 433
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (“Therefore, it is highly unlikely these plaintiffs will find another lender
willing to give them a $60,000 second mortgage at 12% with a 15 year term, prepayment
rights and a balloon payment.  The principal amount, the term, and the prepayment right
may all be different, making the substitute performance too costly or otherwise unaccept-
able.”); Amaysing Techs. Corp. v. Cyberair Commc’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 19890, 2004 WL
1192602, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2004) (plaintiff’s claim that it had “no alternative means of
funding” supported claim for specific performance).
169. BT Triple Crown, 2008 WL 1970900, at *9.  Note that the parties ultimately settled.
See Stipulation and Order Staying All Proceedings, BT Triple Crown Merger Co., Inc. v.
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 08-600899, 2008 WL 5661838 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 14, 2008).
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put the product to a more valuable use.  But the existence of this principle
has generated significant criticism of the tortious-interference doctrine.
As one author noted, “[i]t is startling that doctrine of this sort is imposed
on an economic order committed to competition.”170  Yet, we can push the
rationale for withholding tort liability only so far; a bank should not be
immune from all tort liability.
It is difficult here to analogize contract law to tort law because contract
law uses various means to encourage efficiency: a liability rule protects
some contracting parties when their counterparty breaches, while a prop-
erty rule protects others.  When a property rule applies, we deny the
breaching party the opportunity to simply breach and pay damages.  We
instead leave the outcome up to the aggrieved party itself and the negotia-
tions over the value of the aggrieved party’s right to specific performance
from the counterparty.  Clark Remington has used this distinction be-
tween liability and property rules to develop his theory that liability for
tortious interference should attach when the alleged interferer caused the
breach of a contract for which damages would be an inadequate rem-
edy.171  For example, in Lumley v. Wagner, Johanna Wagner refused to
sing exclusively at a theater in London, as she had promised, and instead
accepted an offer to sing for higher pay at another location.172  Con-
strained by the rule against ordering specific performance of a contract for
personal services, the court enjoined Wagner from singing at the second
location.  She refused to comply, after which the theater filed a separate
action for tortious interference against the owner of the second loca-
tion.173  The court held “that an action lies for maliciously procuring a
breach of contract to give exclusive personal services for a time certain . . .
and produces damage[s].”174
Remington identifies in Lumley v. Gye an important scenario when
liability should exist for tortious interference: when the interferer caused a
“wrongful” breach of contract.  Remington calls a breach wrongful when
contract law would prefer to award specific performance because damages
would be inadequate, but some other principle prohibits an order of spe-
cific performance.175  According to Remington, we should focus less, if at
170. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies:
A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 78 (1982); see also id. at 79
(“In a competitive society it should be assumed that competition is a good thing, and that a
person need not be placed in the position of defending his status as a competitor when he
engages in . . . normal competitive acts.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
171. Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine of
Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 645, 681 (1999).
172. Lumley v. Wagner, [1852] 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 688.
173. Lumley v. Gye, [1853] 118 Eng. Rep. 749.
174. Id.
175. Remington, supra note 171, at 688-89, 697.
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all, on the interferer’s conduct.176  Doing so, Remington argues, should
silence critics of the tort because, on these facts, contract law would place
the right to compel performance in the hands of the aggrieved party, if it
were not prohibited by some principle, and would deny the breaching
party the opportunity to breach and pay damages.177  If the aggrieved
party does forgo its right to compel performance, however, it will have no
contract claim against the breaching party and no tort claim against the
alleged interferer.178  Remington argues that imposing tort liability for in-
terference in these circumstances “sets up no added obstacles to the effi-
cient result.”179  In our case, this is to say that tort liability may be
appropriate when the target bargained for, or is otherwise entitled to, spe-
cific performance of the merger agreement.
Remington’s theory is not a perfect fit to our facts, however, because it
assumes two willing participants: the interferer convinces the breaching
party to deal with him, and the breaching party chooses to make the better
deal with the interfering party.  Under Remington’s theory, the important
legal question is how we should force the breaching party and interferer to
divide the surplus of their presumably more efficient deal with the ag-
grieved party.  But our case does not involve a surplus.  No one is making
a better offer to the breaching party, nor is the breaching party refusing to
perform the merger agreement of its own volition.  It simply has insuffi-
cient funds to close the merger without receiving financing from the bank.
Nonetheless, Remington’s theory raises important questions for our
case.  For example, is the buyer’s breach “wrongful” if its own economic
failure—i.e., its financial inability to close the deal—is the root cause of its
failure to perform (as opposed to its refusal to perform)?  Though merger
agreements often have no-financing-out provisions that speak to this ques-
tion, the issue is far more complicated when they do not, or when a buyer
loses bank financing and suffers an economic decline.  Furthermore, does
a regime that imposes tort liability for wrongful breach, as Remington has
defined it, prevent tort and contract principles from working at cross-pur-
poses and actually give rise to liability in circumstances that demand it?
Imposing tort liability no doubt impedes efficiency: consider the significant
transaction costs associated with bargaining against a background of multi-
billion-dollar potential tort liability, versus bargaining against a back-
ground of more limited contract damages.  Moreover, by focusing on the
breaching party, Remington’s theory sidesteps what should be the
lynchpin of the analysis—the intent of the party committing the tort.  In
addition to allowing what is likely the inefficient application of tortious
interference, Remington’s theory prevents the imposition of tort liability
under circumstances where it is clearly called for to punish an interferer
that is acting maliciously, but has not caused a “wrongful” breach.
176. Id. at 697-98.
177. Id. at 698.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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For those reasons, this article focuses on the conduct of the interferer
and advocates the use of tortious interference only where the interferer
either acts willfully to cause breach, or otherwise acts unlawfully—not
where the interferer is only seeking to abdicate its contractual commit-
ments because nonperformance is efficient.  For example, in the LBO con-
text, tortious interference would be appropriate where a bank, knowing
that the buyer has no other financing option and will have to breach the
merger agreement if the bank walks away, pulls its financing as an exclu-
sively extortionate means or lever to compel the buyer to negotiate more
favorable terms (i.e., to extract concessions from the buyer under the
threat of compelled breach with respect to the target).  The application of
tortious interference also would be appropriate where a bank pulls its fi-
nancing to cause the buyer to breach the merger agreement so that one of
the bank’s clients or affiliates can take the buyer’s place or otherwise gain
a strategic advantage.  In both of these cases, the analysis turns (as it
should) on the intent of the interferer.
Circling back to Remington’s example of Lumley v. Gye, suppose that
on the night Wagner was to sing at the theater, Gye kidnapped her,
thereby preventing her performance.180  Wagner could bring a false im-
prisonment claim against Gye, but the doctrine of impossibility would bar
Lumley’s breach of contract claim against Wagner.  Gye would not have
caused a wrongful breach of contract, as Remington defined such a
breach, because Wagner did not breach at all.  Thus, under the wrongful
breach theory, it appears that Lumley’s tortious interference claim against
Gye should fail.  Remington’s theory does not adequately account for this
Lumley hypothetical, however, and therefore cannot be reconciled with
our case, because we should not bar Lumley from recovering from Gye.
Gye did do something wrong to Lumley: he acted with the purpose of
preventing Wagner from performing her contract with Lumley.  We call
that tortious interference with contract.
C. Current Law Should Be Amended to Prevent A Target From
Introducing Evidence of Settlement Negotiations Between the
Buyer and Bank to Prove the Bank’s Intent to
Interfere With the Merger Agreement
Consider the situation in which the bank and the buyer are prepared to
renegotiate the bank’s commitment.  The bank will not be able to syndi-
cate the loan without relaxed financial covenants and other deal-sweeten-
ing terms.  If this negotiation fails, it intends to breach its commitment—a
fact the buyer has inferred.  Evidence of these negotiations should be
inadmissible in court if offered to prove the bank’s intent to interfere with
the merger agreement.
The negotiations show the bank, facing devastating losses on a loan
that it cannot syndicate, looking for mercy from a buyer.  They also reflect
180. Perlman, supra note 170, at 76.
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the bank’s desire to work with the buyer before breaching their contract.
In this way, the negotiations are not only consistent with the public policy
favoring settlement, but they also increase the likelihood of closing the
deal.181  That is, a buyer that renegotiates the bank’s contract will be more
likely to receive financing than a buyer who refuses to negotiate.  Thus,
allowing a target to introduce evidence of these negotiations as proof that
the bank acted tortiously undermines the target’s own desire to close the
deal, assuming such a desire exists.
State and Federal Rules of Evidence currently encourage the bank to
lend, while still preserving the possibility of tort claims if the bank does
intentionally interfere with a merger agreement.  The rules should say the
following:
Evidence of the following is not admissible when offered to prove liability for,
invalidity of, or amount of a tortious interference with contract claim, or to
impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction:
Furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish to a third party, or accepting,
offering, or promising to accept from a third party any consideration in ex-
change for amending or terminating the contract with that third party; pro-
vided that the court shall balance the probative value of any direct evidence of
fraud or intent against its prejudicial effect.
Most will recognize that the provenance of such a rule is Federal Rule
of Evidence 408.182  Rule 408 implicitly provides certain relevant excep-
tions, and so should the proposal here: “This rule does not require exclu-
sion if the evidence is offered [for example, to prove] a witness’s bias or
prejudice [or negate] contention of undue delay.”
But we cannot rely on Rule 408 to serve our purposes here.  Rule 408
would not apply in the target’s suit against the bank because Rule 408
excludes evidence of an attempted compromise of the claim being litigated,
not the buyer’s potential breach claim against the bank.183  But the rea-
sons for adopting Rule 408 parallel the reasons a related rule should be
extended to our facts.  Rule 408 has at least two purposes: first, the rule
excludes irrelevant evidence—irrelevant because a desire for peace may
motivate the settlement offer, rather than a concession of weakness of po-
sition; and second, the rule advances the strong public policy in favor of
settling disputes.184
181. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
182. Given the various considerations often reflected in a decision to amend the rules of
evidence, aside from the results of the specific change itself, this change could also be made
through common law development.
183. See, e.g., Dahlgren v. First Nat’l Bank of Holdrege, 533 F.3d 681, 699-700 (8th Cir.
2008) (“Rule 408 does not require the exclusion of evidence regarding the settlement of a
claim different from the one litigated, though admission of such evidence may nonetheless
implicate the same concerns of prejudice and deterrence of settlements which underlie Rule
408[.]”) (quoting Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758, 770 (10th Cir. 1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
184. FED. R. EVID. 408 (Advisory Committee’s Note).
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These policies apply with particular force here.  The negotiations of the
bank and buyer do not necessarily reflect the bank’s intent to interfere
with the merger agreement; the bank has no such actual intent and, in any
event, lacks sufficient intent to incur tort liability.185  Nor do the negotia-
tions reveal that the bank never intended to finance the deal.  That is an
implausible argument that assumes that the bank intended to subject itself
to the downside of tort and contract liability without any corresponding
benefit.  The negotiations are precisely what they appear to be—a bank
that faces crippling mark-to-market losses on a deal that it cannot syndi-
cate seeking more reasonable terms from its borrower.  These negotiations
have little, if any, relevance to whether the bank intended to interfere with
the merger agreement, but would substantially prejudice a jury that has
little knowledge about complex leveraged buyouts.186
The negotiations also reflect the bank’s desire to settle any dispute
with the buyer before breaching its commitment.  In this way, the negotia-
tions are not only consistent with the public policy favoring settlement, but
they also increase the likelihood that the deal will close.  That is, a buyer
who bends on certain terms of the bank’s commitment will be more likely
to get the promised financing than a buyer who refuses to negotiate.  Al-
lowing a target to introduce evidence of these negotiations as proof that
the bank acted tortiously undermines the target’s own alleged purpose—
forcing the bank to close on that merger financing.
We must remember context: the scenario being analyzed is not just a
tort case.  The case rests at the crossroads of tort and contract law.  Gener-
ally, contract law encourages parties to perform only when doing so is effi-
cient—i.e., when the benefit of doing so will exceed the costs of
performance.  Contract law does not exist to punish those who breach con-
tracts.  Rather, its design is intended to ensure that the victim of such a
breach is made whole, no more.  Introducing evidence of the bank and
buyer’s negotiations encourages the bank to avoid potentially promising
negotiations, furthers the punishment of a bank that does engage in such
negotiations, and leaves the only legal theory that should conceivably ap-
ply to the bank’s conduct—a contract theory—in shambles.
V. CONCLUSION
These issues affect multi-billion-dollar deals, the creation of share-
holder value, and the broader economy.  For example, when Hexion and
its financiers decided to walk away from the Huntsman transaction, Hex-
ion and Apollo ended up settling for $1 billion, while Deutsche Bank and
Credit Suisse each paid over $300 million in cash and each agreed to pro-
vide another $550 million in senior debt financing to Huntsman.  This
money could have been put to more efficient, value-creating use
elsewhere.
185. See supra Part III.A.
186. See supra notes 20-22 (discussing Huntsman trial tactics).
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Though not readily apparent, these issues are not limited to high-stakes
LBOs.  They affect everyday transactions as well.  Assume that a movie
theater owner wants to show a certain movie in her theater.  She contacts
an intermediary who owns a nonexclusive license to show the film.  That
intermediary properly grants the theater owner permission, but in the face
of plummeting revenues, the movie owner grants an exclusive license to
show the movie to another party for the consideration that is necessary to
keep the company afloat.  The theater owner then sues the movie owner
for tortious interference, and the intermediary sues the movie owner for
specific performance.  While billions of dollars may not be on the line, the
overriding issues are the same.
By failing to take a broader view of the cathedral, the current judicial
landscape creates unnecessary risk and inefficiencies by increasing ex ante
and ex post costs of negotiations.  Negotiating in the shadow of tort liabil-
ity all but ensures that the most efficient result will not be reached.  The
same can be said of specific performance, which destroys the possibility of
efficient breach, resulting in value-destroying overperformance, and en-
courages deleterious strategic behavior.
But that does not have to be the case.  As shown in this article, patches
of caselaw and scholarship can be woven together into an economically
sound framework to address these issues.  This framework allows the en-
tire cathedral to come into focus.  Only then do the rules articulated in this
article make sense.  Specifically, under most circumstances, expectation
damages are the appropriate remedy—nothing else.  That is because im-
posing a liability regime incentivizes wealth-creating efficient breach and
minimizes negotiation costs.  Only under very limited circumstances—i.e.,
where breach is opportunistic or the interferer acts with intent to cause a
breach—should specific performance or tortious interference come into
play.
This agile framework is a perfect match for today’s fast-paced eco-
nomic environment, where markets change rapidly and decision-makers
are forced to constantly reevaluate the economic soundness of their deci-
sions.  Applying a liability rule maximizes joint contractual value, discour-
ages gamesmanship, and minimizes negotiation and monitoring costs.  At
the same time, we must still retain flexibility to “throw the book”187 at and
severely punish opportunistic breachers.  The framework proposed in this
article allows just that by imposing the remedy of specific performance.
For the same reason, it also does not completely immunize an interferer
from tort liability.  Instead, the framework allows claims of tortious inter-
ference to proceed where appropriate: when an interferer intentionally
causes a breach of contract.
The solutions proposed in this article strike a careful balance between
efficiency and punitive concerns.  By doing so, they create a system that
does justice to those involved and improves social welfare.
187. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8 (5th ed. 1998).
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